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such as the presence of an elected mayor, the popular initiative, partisan elections, term
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Cities and other local governments play a crucial role in American democracy. There are
nearly 90,000 local governments in the United States. Collectively, these local governments
employ approximately 11 million workers, collect nearly a quarter of the nation’s revenues,
and allocate a large share of the country’s public goods (U.S. Census of Government 2012;
Trounstine, 2010). As a result, it is crucial to know whether city governments represent the
views of their citizens.
There is a large literature showing that elected officials at the national (Stimson, MacK-
uen, and Erikson, 1995) and state (Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993; Lax and Phillips,
2012) levels are responsive to the policy preferences of their constituents. In contrast, schol-
ars of urban politics have focused on the economic, political, and legal constraints facing local
policymakers (Gerber and Hopkins, 2011; Leigh, 2008; Nivola, 2002; Peterson, 1981, 1995;
Rae, 2003; Self, 2003). Due to the multitude of constraints on local governments, most past
work has concluded that political factors have little influence on local policy outputs (Craw,
2006; Gerber and Hopkins, 2011; Morgan and Watson, 1995; Peterson, 1981; Ruhil, 2003;
Wolman, Strate, and Melchior, 1996). However, there have been no comprehensive studies
about whether city policies are actually responsive to the views of their citizens. This gap
in the literature is largely due to the fact that previous scholars have lacked a measure of
the policy preferences of city residents (Trounstine, 2010). Most previous studies have used
proxies for public opinion such as partisanship or demographic groups rather than a direct
measure of the policy conservatism of citizens in each city and town (e.g., Craw, 2010; Hajnal
and Trounstine, 2010).
In this study, we examine the relationship between the policy preferences of the mass
public and municipal policy outcomes. Our work utilizes new estimates of the mass public’s
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policy conservatism in all cities and towns with more than 20,000 people. Our measures
of city policy conservatism are generated by jointly scaling the ideal points of over 275,000
people from seven recent large-scale surveys, and then using recent advances in opinion esti-
mation to develop more accurate estimates at the city-level. In all, we examine representation
in over 1,600 cities and towns across the country.
In contrast to previous work that emphasizes the constraints on city elected officials, we
find that city governments are responsive to the views of their citizens across a wide range
of policy areas. Moreover, the substantive impact of citizens’ preferences on policy outcomes
is quite large. After controlling for a number of factors that influence city policies, the most
liberal cities spend over twice as much per capita as the most conservative cities. They also
have higher taxes per capita and less regressive tax systems than conservative cities.
Next, we examine whether variation in political institutions affects democratic respon-
siveness in city governments. Many of these institutions were established by reformers to
cultivate ‘better’ government by reducing the power of narrow interests and wresting power
from local bosses. For instance, some cities have elected mayors, while other cities eschew
elected mayors in favor of city councils and professional managers. But the broader impacts
of these reforms are unclear. In particular, we do not know whether they enhance repre-
sentation in city government (Trounstine, 2008). In this paper, we study the impact of five
institutions designed to enhance representation. In contrast to the expectations of reformers,
we find that no institution seems to consistently improve responsiveness.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss previous literature on representation
in municipal government. Next, we examine the previous literature on the impact of local
political institutions on democratic responsiveness. Third, we discuss our research design.
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Next, we present our findings on the responsiveness of city policy outcomes to public opinion
and the effect of political institutions on representation. Finally, we briefly conclude and
discuss the implications for future research.
Responsiveness in City Government
The term responsiveness means that government “responds” to changes in citizens’ views by
moving policy in the direction of those views. Cross-sectionally, this implies that places where
the public holds more conservative views should have more conservative policies (Erikson,
Wright, and McIver, 1993). This definition of responsiveness is based on liberal notions of
popular sovereignty. At a minimum, in a representative democracy the views of citizens
should influence government policy decisions (Achen, 1978).2
Many scholars argue that municipal governments are unresponsive to the views of their
citizens (Craw, 2006; Morgan and Watson, 1995; Peterson, 1981; Ruhil, 2003; Wolman,
Strate, and Melchior, 1996). This view suggests that elected city leaders have limited control
over policy outcomes due to a multitude of institutional constraints (Gerber and Hopkins,
2011). First, cities are subordinate to states and the national government. There are a variety
of statutory or constitutional constraints on specific local policies (Ladd and Yinger, 1989).
For instance, many states restrict local governments’ ability to levy sales or property taxes.
Moreover, there are a number of areas where responsibility over policy is shared between
levels of government (Berman, 2003; Craw, 2006; Nivola, 2002; Peterson, 1995). Federal and
2While responsiveness is a prerequisite for representation, “more” responsiveness does not necessarily
mean that city policies are more “congruent” with the views of citizens (Achen, 1978; Matsusaka, 2001).
Instead, it simply means that the slope of the relationship between public opinion and policy conservatism is
steeper. For more on how responsiveness relates to representation, see Achen (1978) and Matsusaka (2001).
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state governments also exert indirect control over local policy by providing restricted grants
and funding streams for specific programs. In addition, cities face constraints due to eco-
nomic competition from other jurisdictions (Bailey and Rom, 2004; Ladd and Yinger, 1989;
Peterson, 1981; Rae, 2003). Indeed, cities have little control over the movement of people,
industry, and capital across their borders.
Overall, the consensus in the literature on municipal politics is that the policy decisions
of city governments are unresponsive to the views of their citizens. However, there are
reasons to believe that city governments should be responsive to the policy preferences of
their citizens. The central assumption of American politics scholarship over the past 30
years is that elected officials are primarily motivated by electoral incentives (Kousser, Lewis,
and Masket, 2007; Mayhew, 1974). Re-election minded officials have incentives to adhere
to the will of their constituents in order to gain their votes. This means that they should
be responsive to the median voter in their constituency (Downs, 1957; Erikson, Wright, and
McIver, 1993).
A variety of scholars have found that citizens hold local officials accountable for their
decisions in office. Arceneaux (2005) finds that survey respondents connect their evaluation
of mayors’ performance on traffic congestion and other salient issues to their vote choice.
Similarly, Howell and Perry (2004) show that respondents’ evaluations of city services in
four large cities (Charlotte, Chicago, Detroit, and New Orleans) were significantly related to
mayoral approval ratings. Finally, Stein, Ulbig, and Post (2005) find that mayoral approval
significantly predicts vote choice in several recent Houston mayoral elections.
Responsiveness in cities does not necessarily depend on a traditional view of the legislator-
constituent relationship, in which constituents observe the actions of legislators and reward
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whoever best represents their policy preferences. Tiebout (1956) offers a model of city politics
in which citizens locate themselves in cities which best match their preferences for public
goods provision. It may be the case the citizens vote on the basis of vague notions of approval
for the policies of their city, and that their choice to move or stay creates a market-based
mechanism for city representation. In the Tiebout model, citizens need not have a deep
knowledge of the actions of their public officials, they need only know what level of public
goods they are receiving. This logic applies equally well to other policies besides public goods
provision, for instance the kind of public goods provided. One implication of a Tiebout type
model is that representative institutions may not matter very much. Elected politicians
are incentivized to pursue policies that retain and attract like-minded citizens, regardless of
whether they are city councilors or mayors, partisan or non-partisan, or whether voters can
change policy directly at the ballot box.
Some recent work supports the notion that local policymakers are responsive to the views
of their constituents. For instance, Gerber and Hopkins (2011) show that Democratic mayors
spend less on police and fire services than their Republican counterparts.3 Palus (2010)
examines policy responsiveness in twenty-six large cities, and finds strong evidence that the
ideological preferences of citizens are reflected in the spending decisions of governments. At
the county-level, Choi et al. (2010) find that Democratic votes for president are correlated
with greater expenditure levels and a larger share spent on redistribution. Overall, these
previous theoretical and empirical studies on responsiveness lead to our first hypothesis:
H1: City policies are responsive to the policy preferences of their citizens.
3However, Gerber and Hopkins (2011) find no difference between Democratic and Republican mayors in
a variety of other policy areas.
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The Impact of Institutions on Responsiveness in Cities
There are a number of institutions that reformers have established to improve the quality
of municipal government (Lubell et al., 2009; Trounstine, 2008). In this section, we focus
on five such institutions: the presence of a city manager rather than an elected mayor, the
presence of direct democracy provisions, the presence of non-partisan elections for mayor and
city council, the presence of term limits, and the presence of at-large versus single-member
elections.
These institutions are a good test case for the importance of municipal institutions be-
cause they were designed with representation in mind. In particular, reformers around the
turn of the nineteenth century sought to cultivate ‘better’ government by decreasing the
power of party machines, increasing professionalization and promoting political involvement
by the ‘right’ kind of people. The Progressive Era reformers wanted to diminish the power
of narrow interests and wrest power from local bosses. Although the power of party bosses
greatly diminished over the course of the 20th century, the broader impacts of these reforms
is unclear. In particular, we do not know whether they enhance or reduce representation in
cities as a whole, especially now that the power of local political parties are greatly diminished
even in cities that retain pre-reform institutions (Trounstine, 2008).
According to one recent study, “the most frequently analyzed and politically debated
feature of municipal government is the balance of electoral versus managerial power in the
executive branch of city government” (Lubell et al., 2009). In the early twentieth century,
most cities had an elected mayor that led the executive branch and a city council that han-
dled legislative functions (Schiesl, 1977). The Progressive reform movement came to link
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mayor-council systems with the inefficiency and corruption of party machines. Reformers
argued that city governments should be run by experts rather than politicians (Hofstadter,
1956; National Municipal League, 1916). The “reform” council-manager system eliminated
the political position of an elected mayor as chief executive (Lubell et al., 2009). Instead,
cities hired a professional city manager to run the government and make daily administrative
decisions. The mayor was reduced to a figurehead with little real power. Most cities have
adopted a council-manager form of government (Ruhil, 2003; Svara, 1990). While city man-
agers may be better than elected mayors at promoting efficiency and economic development
(Stein, 1990), the dominant view among scholars is that cities with an elected mayor are
more responsive to the views of their citizens than cities with a “reform” council-manager
system (Sharp 1997; but see Lubell et al. 2009). This leads to the hypothesis that:
H2: Cities with elected mayors are more responsive to the views of their citizens than
cities with a council-manager system.
Progressive reformers also believed that partisan elections helped to increase the power
of party bosses. As a result, they promoted the creation of nonpartisan elections for mu-
nicipal office (Trounstine, 2010). In nonpartisan elections, parties do not officially nominate
candidates for office, and candidates’ party affiliations generally do not appear on the ballot.
Most cities in the United States have adopted nonpartisan elections. Scholars have reached
conflicting results on the effect of non-partisan elections on representation. Hansen (1975)
finds some evidence that cities with non-partisan elections have weaker representation. More
recent work on non-partisan judicial elections has found that judges elected through non-
partisan elections are more responsive to public opinion since they cannot rely on partisan
cues to signal their policy positions (Caldarone, Canes-Wrone, and Clark, 2009). But others
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argue that non-partisan elections typically have lower turnout than partisan elections, which
may increase the power of special interests (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright, 2001). We examine
the following hypothesis:
H3: Cities with partisan elections are more responsive to their citizens’ policy preferences
than cities with non-partisan elections.
A more recent reform designed to increase democratic responsiveness is the development
of direct democracy provisions. The potential for citizen initiatives may create stronger
incentives for elected officials to be attentive to constituent interests. As a result, scholars
argue that policy choices are more likely to be responsive to voters’ preferences when direct
democracy exists (McCabe and Feiock, 2005). While few studies have studied the effect of
direct democracy on representation at the local level (Lubell et al., 2009), the evidence at
the state level is mixed. A number of studies have found that majoritarian interests are more
likely to prevail in states with direct democracy institutions (Gerber, 1999; Matsusaka, 2010;
Tolbert, 1998). But other studies find no significant relationship between the presence of the
citizen initiative and democratic responsiveness (Lax and Phillips, 2012). We examine the
following hypothesis:
H4: Cities with direct democracy provisions are more responsive to the views of their
citizens than citizens without direct democracy.
Reformers in the late 20th century have also argued that the presence of term limits
affects the link between elected officials and their constituents (Carey, Niemi, and Powell,
2000). Some scholars find evidence that the turnover caused by term limits leads to less
experienced elected officials (Kousser, 2005). This reduces the capacity of lawmakers to assess
and respond to public opinion. Moreover, it may reduce legislators’ incentives to respond
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to public opinion by limiting the value of elected office (Carey et al., 2006). However, other
scholars argue that the turnover caused by term limits reduces incumbency advantages and
leads elected officials to better reflect current constituents’ preferences (Moncrief and Story,
2007). This leads to our fifth hypothesis:
H5: Cities with term limits for their officials are more responsive to their citizens’ policy
preferences than cities without term limits.
Reformers in the early 20th century also promoted city-wide (“at-large”) elections to pre-
vent narrow interests from exerting too large an influence on local government (Trounstine,
2010). In unreformed cities, the municipality is divided into geographic areas of roughly
equal population size, and each district elects a single city councilor. In reformed cities,
councilors are elected by the municipality as a whole. Most previous studies on the im-
pact of at-large elections focus on descriptive representation. These studies generally find
better descriptive representation for African-Americans and other racial minorities under a
districted system than an at-large system (Bullock and MacManus, 1993; Davidson and Grof-
man, 1994; Trounstine and Valdini, 2008; Welch, 1990). However, while at-large elections
may harm descriptive representation, there are good reasons to believe they should enhance
responsiveness by “shift[ing] electoral power toward a single median voter and away from
geographically concentrated interests” (Trounstine, 2010). This leads to our final hypothesis:
H6: Cities with at-large districts are more responsive to citizens’ policy preferences than
cities with single-member districts.
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Research Design
Measuring City Policy Preferences
As the starting place for our model of city policy conservatism, we estimate a large sample
of citizens’ ideal points using an approach similar to the one taken by Tausanovitch and
Warshaw (2013). First, we pool together data from seven recent large-scale surveys of the
American public (the 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election
Surveys (CCES) and the 2000 and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (NAES)).
Each of these surveys asked between 14 and 32 policy questions to 30,000-80,000 Americans.
We assume that all survey respondents have a quadratic utility function with normal
errors. Each item j presents individual i with a choice between a “Yes” position and a “No”
position. We assume that respondents’ policy preferences lie in a one-dimensional policy
space. A preliminary test of this assumption is provided in Appendix B.4 We estimate
respondents’ ideal points using a Bayesian Item-Response (IRT) model (Clinton, Jackman,
and Rivers, 2004). In all, we estimate the ideal points of over 275,000 Americans.
Next, we estimate city-level policy conservatism by combining our individual-level data
with a multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) model (Park, Gelman, and Bafumi,
2004). This approach employs Bayesian statistics and multi-level modeling to incorporate
information about respondents’ demographics and geography in order to estimate the public
4A potential critique of this approach is that it is plausible that Americans’ preferences on city policies
are distinct from their preferences on national policies. Indeed, scholars of municipal politics have often
highlighted the fact that cities consider issues that are quite different from the sorts of policy issues that are
considered at the federal level (Oliver, Ha, and Callen, 2012). To test this hypothesis, on the 2012 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study we asked both a battery of federal policy questions and a battery of questions
that was oriented towards state and local politics. Overall, we find no evidence that separate forces are at
work in determining citizens’ positions on municipal policy questions and federal policy questions. More
information on this analysis is in Appendix B.
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opinion of each geographic sub-unit. One way of thinking about an MRP model is to compare
it to a weighted survey estimate that applies very finely tuned weightings, based on Census
data, of specific demographic-geographic types. It estimates each individual’s response as a
function of both demographic and geographic predictors. MRP models have been found to
produce very accurate estimates of public opinion by state and congressional district with
national samples of just a few thousand respondents (Lax and Phillips, 2009; Warshaw and
Rodden, 2012).
To validate our estimates of city policy conservatism, we compare them with estimates
of presidential vote share in each city derived from precinct-level election returns (Harvard
Election Data Archive, 2012). Our estimates of city policy conservatism are correlated with
presidential vote share in the 2008 election at .77. This suggests that our estimates are
accurately capturing cities’ policy preferences on a left-right continuum.5
Figure 1 shows the policy preferences of the 51 cities with a population larger than 250,000
people. We find significant variation in the policy preferences of cities. Not surprisingly, we
find that San Francisco, Washington DC, and Seattle are three of the most liberal cities in
the country. Mesa, AZ, Oklahoma City, OK and Virginia Beach, VA are three of the most
conservative cities.
5Appendix A contains additional analyses to validate our estimates of city conservatism. Here, we use
a number of complementary approaches to validate our estimates of city policy preferences. First, we
demonstrate the face validity of our estimates by showing our estimates for all large cities in the country, as
well as a subset of cities in four states. Next, we show the internal validity of our estimates by comparing
them with raw, disaggregated estimates of the policy preferences in each city based on our sample of 275,000
Americans. Finally, we use two separate approaches to demonstrate the external validity of our estimates.
We show that our estimates are highly correlated with city-level presidential vote shares in both 2004 and
2008. We also show that our estimates are highly correlated with estimates of symbolic ideology from survey
samples collected by the Knight Foundation in twenty-six medium and large cities in 2002. Of course, like any
measurement of a latent variable, our measures of city policy preferences are estimates. They will generally
be more precise in large cities than small cities.
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[Figure 1 about here]
Measuring the Policy Outcomes
One of the challenges in research on municipal politics is that there are few comprehensive
sources of information on city policies. Ideally, we would use an existing measure of the
“conservatism” of city policies that is analogous to the measure of state policies developed
by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993). However, there is no existing measure of policy
conservatism available at the city level. As a result, we use a mixed approach and measure
city policy outcomes using data from a variety of sources.
First, we developed a new scaled measure of policy outcomes using data from the Inter-
national City/County Management Association’s (ICMA) 2010 survey of government sus-
tainability. The ICMA survey asks city officials a series of questions about policies that have
been enacted by the city government, which they are asked to answer on a factual basis.
The survey has an emphasis on environmental policies, but also asks about an array of other
policies, such as whether the city provides financial incentives for affordable housing, pro-
vides funding for preschool education, or has a program for the purchase or development
of historic property, among many others. These questions are scaled in the same way as
our measure of citizens’ policy conservatism, using the 2-parameter quadratic item response
model introduced into political science by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004). Much as
individuals choose whether to support a given policy, city government must choose whether
to enact these policies, providing us information about the conservatism of the city as a
decision-making body.
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The resulting measure is as close as we were able to come to a broad liberal-conservative
policy score for each city. This measure is a one-dimensional summary of a wide variety of pol-
icy “stances,” but in this case the stances are actual enacted policies. However, this measure
is not without drawbacks. The survey is intended to evaluate local efforts towards environ-
mental sustainability, and so many of the questions are focused on policies geared towards
energy, the environment, and conservation. We find little evidence of a higher-dimensional
structure in this data, lending credence to our assumption that this set of questions repre-
sents policy more broadly, but it is always possible that this unidimensionality is the result
of the exclusion of certain policy issues. This is one reason why our analysis uses three other
measures of policy outcomes that we describe below. A full list of questions used on the
ICMA survey is provided in Appendix C, and the estimates themselves are available from
the authors.
We generate three other city policy measures using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
2007 Census of Governments, which provide detailed revenue, expenditure, and employment
data for U.S. local governments.6 First, we estimate the per capita taxes in each city. Per
capita taxes capture the total potential for redistribution within a particular city, and the
tax burden is a major issue both within cities and nationally. Next, we estimate the per
capita expenditures in each city. Per capita expenditures capture the size of government,
one of the core ‘liberal-conservative’ issues in American politics. Finally, we estimate the
regressiveness of city taxation based on the share of each city’s revenues that are derived
from sales taxes.7 Higher shares of sales taxes indicates a local tax structure that falls more
6In some cases, we augment data for cities that failed to respond to the Census of Governments with data
from the Census Bureau’s most recently available annual Annual Survey of Governments
7Note, however, that the progressivity of property taxes depends on the business vs. residential rate. The
incidence of property taxes, and hence their overall progressivity, is a matter of some debate in the economics
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heavily on poor residents, whereas tax structures based more heavily on property tax and
income taxes are generally more redistributive (Newman and O’Brien, 2011).
City Institutions
Next, we examine the association between city institutions and responsiveness. Data on
municipal institutions was obtained from a variety of sources. We collected data on cities
that have elected mayors or council-manager systems from the 1987 Census of Governments.
This data was verified against more recent data from the ICMA’s Form of Government
surveys.8 Data on the presence of direct democracy in cities was obtained from the ICMA’s
Form of Governments survey. We filled in data for missing cities from the Initiative &
Referendum Institute at the University of Southern California and an internet search of city
websites. We obtained information on whether cities have partisan elections or nonpartisan
elections from the ICMA’s Form of Governments survey. We filled in data for cities that were
not present in the ICMA data using data from Gerber and Hopkins (2011) and an internet
search of city websites. We collected information on whether cities have term limits for their
elected officials using the ICMA’s Form of Government surveys and an internet search of
city websites.9 Finally, we collected information on whether cities use at-large elections for
their city councilors using the ICMA’s Form of Government surveys and the 1987 Census of
Governments.
literature. For more on this debate, see Zodrow (2001).
8See Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2008) for an overview of previous studies using ICMA data. We verified
the data using the 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011 ICMA surveys. Cities that had changed their institutions
were updated.
9In a few cases, we also filled in missing institutional data by emailing city clerks.
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Explaining Variation in City Policies
In order to examine the relationship between city conservatism and policy outcomes, we
construct a multi-level regression model that controls for a variety of political, economic,
and legal factors. In particular, we are concerned about the effects of factors that contribute
to a city’s governing capacity. Cities may be constrained by the resources available to them
and the extent of the duties they can reasonably be expected to perform. Large cities or rich
cities can be expected to be involved in more areas of public life than cities that lack the
resources to engage in as many projects. In contrast, smaller, poorer cities may have simpler
tax systems, fewer environmental regulations, and lower expenditures. For this reason we
include controls for city population, the median income, and median housing value. We also
control for the percentage of each city’s population that is African-American (percent black).
(See Table 1 for descriptive statistics of all our variables).
[Table 1 about here]
It is also important to account for heterogeneity in the constraints facing municipal
policymakers across states. Indeed, city governments only have powers allocated to them by
state laws and constitutions. As a result, the state legal and political context can exert an
important influence on municipal policy decisions. We account for state heterogeneity by
including random effects for each state in our multilevel models.
While our multi-level model is well suited to examine the association between city conser-
vatism and policy outcomes, it is difficult to interpret the results for the effect of institutions
on representation. As we will see, responsiveness of policy to the mass public’s conservatism
is non-linear, often due to what seems to be a conservative “floor” (cities can only spend
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so little, for instance). A very simple linear model does an adequate job of summarizing
responsiveness, but does not capture the potential differences across different institutional
settings. As a result, a quadratic model would be preferred. However, this introduces five
more interaction terms into our model, and the squared terms have to be interpreted in con-
junction with the non-squared terms. A simpler approach is to use a pre-processing method
to approximate balance between institutional conditions, and then use simple non-parametric
smoothing methods to show the effects in each institutional condition.
Pre-processing methods are attractive for analyses involving large datasets where balance
can plausibly be established by re-weighing the data to achieve balance between the treatment
and control groups. Ho et al. (2007) make the case that pre-processing reduces model
dependence and provides more accurate causal inferences compared to standard ordinary
least squares methods. The large set of cities in our dataset allows us to ‘simulate’ the
balance achieved by a random experiment by re-weighting our data to ensure balance on all
our covariates (Hainmueller, 2012).
For this analysis, we use entropy balancing matching (Hainmueller, 2012).10 Entropy
balancing matching applies a maximum entropy reweighting scheme that calibrates unit
weights so that the reweighted treatment and control group satisfy a potentially large set of
prespecified balance conditions that incorporate information about known sample moments.
In our analysis, for each institutional hypothesis, we balance our covariates’ first moments
for cities with one institution, and cities with the other.11 The “control” group may then
10We also evaluate the robustness of our results to alternative matching methods by applying coarsened
exact matching (CEM) to our data rather than entropy balancing (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012). We found
no substantive differences across different matching models. Results are available in Appendix E.
11We also balance the second moment for the city conservatism variable. This ensures that the variances
of the distribution of city conservatism are balanced across the treatment and control conditions.
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be compared to the “treatment” group. This enables us to simply compare the slope of the
relationship between outcomes and policy preferences for the two groups.12 We balance on
median income, median home values, population, the presence of each institution, and city
conservatism.
Are City Policies Responsive to their Citizens?
What is the relationship between city policy outcomes and city conservatism? Figure 2 shows
the relationship between citizens’ conservatism and four different city policies for the 1,600
cities in our dataset. Each panel shows scatter plots of a policy outcome on the y axis, and
mean policy preferences of a given city on the x axis. The panel on the top left is our general
policy scale. The panel on the top right shows the relationship between city conservatism
and taxes per capita. On the bottom left, we show the association between city conservatism
and the share of taxes that come from sales taxes.13 Finally, the bottom right plot shows
the relationship between policy policy preferences and expenditures per capita. The top ten
most populous cities are labeled in each panel with their official abbreviation. We also label
Washington, DC, which is a notable outlier on most policy outcomes. The size of the circles
representing each city are proportional to population. It is important to note, however, that
the analyses are not weighted by population. Loess curves are fitted to each scatterplot.
[Figure 2 about here]
12In our main analysis, we compare non-parametric curves of cities in the treatment and control groups
for each institutional category. In Appendix D, we show parametric model results with fixed effects for each
state.
13In this model, we only examine cities in states that allow municipalities to levy a sales tax.
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These simple bivariate relationships go consistently in the direction we would expect. On
the general policy scale, cities with more liberal populations tend to get more liberal policy,
and this relationship is remarkably strong and linear. Likewise, liberal cities collect more
taxes per capita and have substantially higher expenditures per capita. Moreover, liberal
cities have less regressive tax systems. The share of sales revenues that comes from sales
taxes is lower in liberal cities and higher in conservative cities.
These effects are all large, with upward slopes that cover most of the span of the policy
outcome. However, in the case of expenditures per capita and taxes per capita, the rela-
tionship is difficult to see due to a small number of high values that stretch the scale of the
y-axis. In Figure 3, we re-plot these policy outcomes, censoring the y-axis far below the
maximum values. In both cases the effect is large, but seems to taper off on the right side
of the spectrum, perhaps indicating a minimum level of taxes and service provision that is
supported by conservatives.
[Figure 3 about here]
Despite a strong bivariate relationship, a number of factors appear to moderate this
relationship, as well they should. It appears from Figures 1 and 2 that more populous places
have a tendency to be closer to the liberal side of the policy and public preferences, and
that there may be a tendency for larger cities to adopt more liberal policies irrespective of
preferences. We expect this to be the case, because liberal policy is usually associated with
more government activity and larger cities have more capacity for activity. This may also
be the case for richer cities.
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In order to account for these possibilities, we run a multi-level regression model that
includes possible confounders, such as the size, wealth, and ethnic diversity levels of each
city (Table 2). Controlling for other factors that influence city policy outcomes leaves the
core relationships that we find in our bivariate analysis relatively unchanged. City policy
conservatism has a robust, statistically significant, and substantively important relationship
with the type of policy that cities implement. These relationships are similar in models that
account for possible confounders.
[Table 2 about here]
In order to understand the substantive significance of these effects, it is important to
consider the scale of the outcome policies under examination. How strong should we expect
these relationships to be if democracy is very strong? One way to look at this question
is to examine the size of the “errors” from our model for each policy outcome. Figure 4
shows the estimated distribution of errors from a Bayesian implementation of our multi-
level model with uninformative priors. These histograms represent the estimated posterior
distribution of the residuals for the model- in other words, the distribution of differences
from the predictions of the model and the observed outcome variables. The median error in
predicting our policy scale is 0.54 standard deviations. The median error in the predicted
share of taxes from sales tax is just 12%. The median error for taxes per capita is only 195
dollars, and the median error for expenditures is 392 dollars. How should these errors be
interpreted? Quite simply, they suggest that citizens could expect their per capita tax levy
to be within 195 dollars of the taxes in similar cities with the same political preferences. In
substantive terms, the relationship between preferences and outcomes is tight. This suggests
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that city governments are responsive to the preferences of their citizens.
[Figure 4 about here]
Do Institutions Affect Responsiveness in Cities?
Next, we examine our hypotheses about the impact of city institutions on responsiveness
to public opinion. Table 3 shows the results of a simple multilevel regression with random
effects for states. The key variables are the interactions between city conservatism and
each institution. These interactions measure whether each institution is making cities more
responsive to the preferences of their citizens. Our approach to estimating responsiveness
rests on a simple premise: that the differences in responsiveness should produce differences in
the slope of the relationship between policy preferences and policy outcomes. Greater slopes
indicate greater responsiveness (Lax and Phillips, 2012). However, due to the fact that the
policy preferences measures and policy outcomes measures are not in the same space, higher
slopes do not necessarily imply greater congruence or proximity between the preferences of
citizens and city policy conservatism (Achen, 1977, 1978; Matsusaka, 2001). Instead, greater
slopes could indicate overreactions to constituent preferences (Erikson, Wright, and McIver,
1993, 93-94).14 As a result, we will not be able to assess the degree to which any given
city policy is a good match for the preferences of the citizens of that city. We also cannot
say for certain whether an increase in slope is normatively good for representation. It could
be that a particular institution causes an increase in responsiveness, but this increase in
14Future work might try to address this problem by jointly-scaling city policy outcomes and citizens’ policy
preferences. This would enable researchers to examine how institutions affect the congruence between public
opinion and city policy conservatism.
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responsiveness reflects an overreaction to constituent preferences.
[Table 3 about here]
Across all five institutions, we find no consistent statistically significant interactive effect
between institutions and policy conservatism. Only two of these twenty coefficients are sig-
nificant. We have few a priori reasons to suspect that these effects should vary over different
policy outcomes. This suggests that institutions are having little effect on representation in
municipal governments.15
Next, we examine the results of our analysis of the impact of institutions on representation
using data that is pre-processed using entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012). For each
institution, the unit weights are calibrated to ensure balance on all covariates. In our main
text, we present non-parametric results graphically where sets of points are color coded, grey
for cities with in one institutional condition, and black for cities in the other. In Appendix
D, we show parametric results using the pre-processed data with fixed effects for each state.
Figures 5 - 9 show the results of this analysis. Each of the four panels has as its y-
axis the same four policy outcomes from Figure 2. Each plot shows a loess curve fitted to
the resulting scatterplots of the matched data, with a separate curve for each institutional
condition. The scatterplots for the relationship between each city policy outcome and mean
city policy preferences are shown. For each institutional condition, a loess curve is drawn
through the corresponding points, weighted to balance institutional conditions with unequal
15We re-ran all the models in Table 3 using fixed effects for states rather than random effects. The
substantive findings are all identical to the models with random effects. We also re-ran each of the models
with only a single institutional factor interacted with the measure of citizens’ policy preferences. This
addresses a potential concern that multicollinearity between institutions could attenuate the impact of any




A few preliminary observations are in order. Firstly, the number of points in the top left
panel is much smaller than the number of points in the other panels due to the relatively
small number of cities that respond to the ICMA policy survey. As a result, there is a
tendency for the curves in this panel to be the most different from each other due to random
error. Likewise, within each panel, the curves are likely to differ most due to random error
where the data is sparse, such as at the far right and far left of the graph.
[Figure 5 about here]
Figure 5 shows the results of the matching analysis for the type of government: mayoral or
council-manager. Cities with elected mayors are drawn in black, and cities with city managers
are drawn in grey, as are the corresponding loess curves. Figure 5 shows a remarkable lack
of difference between the curves across three of the four policy outcomes. The policy scale
in the upper-left panel is the only outcome that shows any difference between cities with
elected mayors and council-manager systems. Here, the black line is above the grey line,
indicating that policy is slightly more conservative on average in cities with mayors. This
is a statistically significant difference. However, this relationship does not hold up in the
other analyses, and it does not indicate a difference in responsiveness per se. Other apparent
differences, such as the far left side of the top right panel with expenditures as the dependent
variable, are supported by very few data points. Overall, the responsiveness curves for mayor
and council-manager cities are practically indistinguishable for per capita taxes, per capita
expenditures, and the percentage of city revenues that come from sales taxes. Thus, our
16Weighting follows the procedure from Hainmueller (2012).
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results provide little evidence for H2, our hypothesis that cities with directly elected mayors
are more responsive. City manager systems, designed to be more professional and less
political, appear to be just as responsive to public opinion as their mayoral counterparts.
Given the same set of public policy preferences, a city with a mayor looks almost exactly the
same as a city with a city manager for most policy outcomes.
[Figure 6 about here]
This pattern of little institutional difference is continued in Figure 6, where cities with
partisan elections are shown in black. The responsiveness curves are again very similar.
Cities with partisan elections and cities without partisan elections appear to have roughly
the same level of responsiveness. Differences in the curves are too small to attribute to
systematic differences across institutions. Thus, we cannot conclude that whether cities
have partisan or nonpartisan elections has an impact on the link between public opinion and
public policy outcomes.
[Figure 7 about here]
Figure 7 shows the results for cities with (in black) and without (in grey) a popular
initiative process. The overarching patterns are the same as for previous institutions. Across
most of the support of the data, the estimated relationship between cities’ policy conservatism
and their policy outcomes is nearly identical for cities with and without direct democracy.
Overall, it appears to be the case that public views are about as well represented in cities
where citizens are not able to vote on legislation at the ballot box as cities where they are.
[Figure 8 about here]
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Figure 8 shows the result of the matching analysis in the case of city council term limits.
Cities with term limits are shown in black. Once again, the curves for cities with and without
term limits are close to identical over most of the support of the data for each policy outcome.
In this case the curves are particularly close, even at the extremes of the data. Overall, our
findings provide no support for H5, that term limits lead to greater responsiveness.
[Figure 9 about here]
Finally, Figure 9 shows the results of the matching analysis for cities with and without
at-large districts. Cities with all at-large elections are shown in black, and cities with single-
member districts are shown in grey. As with the other institutional conditions, there is
little evidence of consistent variation in responsiveness across policy outcomes. The only
notable results are that, contrary to H6, the slope of the relationship between citizens’
policy preferences and cities’ per capita expenditures and the share of taxes they derive
from sales taxes is different in at-large than district-based cities. In both cases, cities with
at-large elections are somewhat less responsive to their citizens’ policy preferences. But both
of these differences in responsiveness are relatively small. There is also no difference in the
relationship between public opinion and city policy conservatism in cities with and without
at-large elections for our other two policy outcomes (the policy scale and per capita taxes).
Therefore, overall, our findings provide no support for H6, that at-large districts lead to
better representation.
Across five different policy outcomes, we find no evidence that any institution consistently
affects representation in municipal government. These institutions, however, exist under con-
ditions that are different from when many of them were formulated. Although the literature
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on representation in cities has emphasized their role in changing the politics of local gov-
ernment and breaking party monopolies, their influence on systematic representation today
has been under-explored. Despite much attention to these institutions, whatever effect that
they might have on policy responsiveness is too small for us to detect. Progressive reformers
may not have been too surprised to learn that these institutions are not as influential today
as they may have been in the past. After all, the party machines that these policies were
designed to mitigate are long gone.
Conclusion
A 2002 piece in the Annual Review of Political Science summarized the literature on mu-
nicipal politics by stating that, “Politics has not always fared well in the political science
literature on the cities, at least not in the United States” (Murphy, 2002). In contrast to
much of this literature, we find that a broad array of city policy outcomes are not apolitical,
nor are they divorced from national political schisms.17 Policy outcomes in city and town
governments can be predicted by the policy conservatism of their citizens. “Liberal” cities
seem to get “liberal” policies and “conservative” cities seem to get “conservative” policies on
average, controlling for other factors that might account for policy differences. This suggests
that not only is city government political, but that it may have more in common with state
and national politics than previous scholars have recognized.
However, unlike at the state and national level, we find scant evidence that differences in
municipal political institutions affect representation. Neither the choice of mayor versus city
17Of course, we only examine a subset of city policy outcomes. It is possible that the link between public
opinion and policy could look different on other outcomes.
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council government, partisan or non-partisan elections, the availability of ballot measures,
whether or not elected officials face term limits, or whether there are at-large or districted
elections seem to affect the strength of the relationship between public policy preferences and
city policies. This is contrary to hypotheses based on evidence from the existing literature,
both from within the city politics literature and from scholarship on states and nations.
While we are hesitant to put too sharp of a point on a null result, the similarity between
responsiveness in different institutions is striking across different policy outcomes, even when
we allow this relationship to have a very general functional form. Considering the emphasis
in the literature on the importance of these institutions, the fact that we find few differences
in responsiveness across institutions is striking.
Our results suggest that the effects of institutions on democratic representation may have
been overstated by previous studies. But it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which our
results are generalizable to other contexts. Part of the difficulty in generalizing these effects
is establishing the categories that they should be applied to. Even within the category of
local governments, there are many different types besides municipal governments: there are
school districts, counties, utility districts, and many more. Cities themselves have scopes
of authority and responsibility that differ widely (Oliver, Ha, and Callen, 2012), a fact that
we have dealt with here merely by controlling for the size of populations and economies. A
further complication is that the institutions of different levels of government may interact.
Many of the institutions we have examined, however, share important features of state and
national governments. Council manger governments share many features with parliamentary
government and mayoral government is quite similar to a presidential system. Term limits
have been implemented at all levels of government. The salience, prominence or even legality
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of party labels may vary at different levels of government. Moreover, direct democracy
provisions such as popular initiatives and referenda have been used at all levels of government.
Future work should seek to incorporate these institutional differences into their theories in
order to examine the degree to which the effect of institutions varies across different levels of
government. For instance, scholars could attempt to explain why institutions such as direct
democracy and term limits appear to have a greater effect on representation at the state
level than at the municipal level.
Future research should also explore the impact of other institutions in city government
on representation. For instance, it might explore whether variation between concurrent
and off-cycle elections affects the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes
(Anzia, 2011). Finally, research in this area could benefit from examining a broader range
of city policy outcomes, such as distributional and land development policies. This will
enable scholars to determine whether the relationship between public opinion and policy
varies across different issue areas.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max
Policy Conservatism -1.019 -0.208 -0.025 -0.053 0.123 0.669
Median Income ($100,000) 0.15 0.3408 0.42 0.46 0.56 1.40
City Population (100,000) 0.20 0.26 0.39 0.81 0.67 80.08
Percent Black 0.001 0.016 0.043 0.115 0.146 0.977
Housing Value 0.36 0.85 1.17 1.45 1.70 9.94
Policy Scale -2.39 -0.63 -0.04 -0.02 0.61 3.73
Expenditures Per Capita 15 943 1,234 1,541 1,770 14,053
Taxes Per Capita 49 461 609 759 854 8,629
Share of taxes from sales tax 0.00 0.12 0.25 0.28 0.40 0.92
Table 2: Association Between City Liberalism and Policy Outcomes
Dependent variable:
Scaled Policy Per Capita Expend. Per Capita Taxes Sales Tax Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(Intercept) 0.13∗ 0.18 1,838.85∗∗ 1,780.02∗∗ 898.88∗∗ 589.41∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(0.07) (0.15) (207.31) (217.62) (144.72) (147.65) (0.05) (0.05)
Policy Conservatism 1.19∗∗ 1.04∗∗ −760.75∗∗ −347.42∗∗ −365.93∗∗ −132.47∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.18) (0.19) (97.42) (116.80) (47.63) (51.96) (0.02) (0.02)
Median Income 0.29 −720.01∗∗ 77.32 −0.22∗∗
(0.35) (204.90) (92.21) (0.04)
City Population −0.01 54.41∗∗ 35.72∗∗ −0.00
(0.01) (7.77) (3.42) (0.00)
Percent Black 0.15 330.05∗ 328.28∗∗ −0.13∗∗
(0.39) (177.82) (79.32) (0.04)
Med. Housing Value −0.15∗∗ 238.69∗∗ 183.87∗∗ 0.01∗
(0.06) (39.24) (17.42) (0.01)
Observations 437 436 1,619 1,618 1,575 1,574 968 967
Log Likelihood −546.35 −547.24 −13,218.37 −13,146.86 −11,729.34 −11,524.30 635.54 651.17
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,100.71 1,110.48 26,444.74 26,309.71 23,466.68 23,064.59 −1,263.08 −1,286.34
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,117.03 1,143.10 26,466.30 26,352.82 23,488.13 23,107.48 −1,243.58 −1,247.34
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table 3: Effect of Institutions on Responsiveness
Dependent variable:
Scaled Policy Per Capita Expend. Per Capita Taxes Sales Tax Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(Intercept) 0.13∗ 0.06 1,838.85∗∗ 1,723.01∗∗ 898.88∗∗ 558.16∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.46∗∗
(0.07) (0.18) (207.31) (217.25) (144.72) (148.45) (0.05) (0.05)
Policy Conservatism 1.19∗∗ 1.05∗∗ −760.75∗∗ −376.42∗ −365.93∗∗ −118.51 0.08∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.18) (0.41) (97.42) (227.12) (47.63) (103.31) (0.02) (0.04)
Elected Mayor 0.43∗∗ −117.33∗∗ −40.89∗ −0.01
(0.11) (53.65) (24.47) (0.01)
Direct Democracy −0.02 119.43∗∗ 42.99∗ −0.00
(0.10) (53.73) (24.43) (0.01)
Partisan Elections −0.06 −34.69 85.54∗∗ −0.02
(0.16) (83.38) (38.70) (0.02)
Term Limits −0.08 84.08 −7.66 −0.02
(0.11) (59.00) (26.63) (0.01)
At-large Elections 0.05 −4.36 20.81 −0.01
(0.10) (49.21) (22.45) (0.01)
Median Income 0.37 −713.72∗∗ 39.54 −0.22∗∗
(0.37) (209.37) (95.44) (0.04)
City Population −0.01 46.56∗∗ 35.24∗∗ 0.00
(0.01) (7.80) (3.51) (0.00)
Percent Black 0.04 172.09 306.79∗∗ −0.16∗∗
(0.40) (192.32) (87.46) (0.04)
Median Housing Value −0.15∗∗ 245.01∗∗ 184.08∗∗ 0.01
(0.06) (38.95) (17.65) (0.01)
Conservatism x Mayor −0.16 −295.48 23.79 −0.03
(0.45) (182.93) (83.32) (0.04)
Conser. x Direct Dem. −0.06 64.86 15.16 0.04
(0.37) (192.25) (87.26) (0.04)
Conser. x Part. Elect. −0.06 −195.20 −96.51 −0.04
(0.49) (235.00) (107.83) (0.05)
Conser. x Term Limits −0.14 −286.56 −32.34 0.03
(0.40) (209.05) (94.89) (0.04)
Conser. x At-large 0.11 441.78∗∗ 23.14 −0.07∗∗
(0.34) (166.79) (76.13) (0.03)
Observations 437 428 1,619 1,461 1,575 1,433 968 907
Log Likelihood −546.35 −536.35 −13,218.37 −11,757.12 −11,729.34 −10,420.13 635.54 593.74
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,100.71 1,108.70 26,444.74 23,550.23 23,466.68 20,876.26 −1,263.08 −1,151.49
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,117.03 1,181.76 26,466.30 23,645.40 23,488.13 20,971.08 −1,243.58 −1,064.90
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Figure 2: Responsiveness of City Policy to Public Ideology. Each circle represents a city,
with diameter scaled to log population. The lines are unweighted loess curve fits. Two letter
abbreviations are shown for cities that are in in the top 10 most populous in America and




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Responsiveness- Zoomed. This Figure repeats the panels on the right side of Figure
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Figure 4: Error Distribution of Responsiveness Residuals. These figures graph the posterior
distributions of the prediction errors from four Bayesian models that correspond to the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Type of Government. The black points in each panel are municipalities with
elected mayors and the grey points are municipalities with council manager governments.
Each black line is the loess curve for the mayoral cities. The grey line is a weighted loess
curve for the council-manager cities that uses entropy balancing matching weights. These
weights are chosen to achieve balance between the two instutional conditions on median
income, median home values, population, city conservatism and the use of partisan elections,









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Partisan Elections. The black points in each panel are municipalities with partisan
elections and the grey points are municipalities with non-partisan elections. Each black line
is the loess curve for the partisan-election cities. The grey line is a weighted loess curve
for the non-partisan election cities that uses entropy balancing matching weights. These
weights are chosen to achieve balance between the two instutional conditions on median
income, median home values, population, city conservatism and the use of direct mayoral























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Direct Democracy. The black points in each panel are municipalities that allow
ballot initiatives and the grey points are municipalities that do not. Each black line is the
loess curve for the ballot initiative cities. The grey line is a weighted loess curve for the
non-ballot initiative cities that uses entropy balancing matching weights. These weights are
chosen to achieve balance between the two instutional conditions on median income, median
home values, population, city conservatism and the use of direct mayoral elections, partisan
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Term Limits. The black points in each panel are municipalities that have city
council term limits and the grey points are municipalities that do not. Each black line is
the loess curve for the term limit cities. The grey line is a weighted loess curve for the non-
term limit initiative cities that uses entropy balancing matching weights. These weights are
chosen to achieve balance between the two instutional conditions on median income, median
home values, population, city conservatism and the use of direct mayoral elections, partisan
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: At-Large Elections. The black points in each panel are municipalities that have
at-large elections and the grey points are municipalities that do not. Each black line is the
loess curve for the at-large cities. The grey line is a weighted loess curve for the mixed or
single-member district cities that uses entropy balancing matching weights. These weights
are chosen to achieve balance between the two instutional conditions on median income,
median home values, population, city conservatism and the use of direct mayoral elections,
partisan elections, ballot initiatives, and term limits.
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A City Policy Preferences: Description & Validation
We estimate municipal policy preferences by combining our large dataset of citizens’ ideal
points with a multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) model (Park, Gelman, and
Bafumi, 2004; Lax and Phillips, 2009). This approach employs Bayesian statistics and multi-
level modeling to incorporate information about respondents’ demographics and geography in
order to estimate the public opinion of each geographic sub-unit. One way of thinking about
an MRP model is to compare it to a weighted survey estimate that applies very finely tuned
weightings, based on Census data, of specific demographic-geographic types. It estimates
each individual’s response as a function of both demographic and geographic predictors.
MRP models have been found to produce very accurate estimates of public opinion by state
and congressional district with national samples of just a few thousand respondents (Park,
Gelman, and Bafumi, 2004; Lax and Phillips, 2009; Warshaw and Rodden, 2012)
There are two stages to the MRP model. In the first stage, we estimate each individual’s
opinion on a given issue as a function of his or her demographics, city, and state (for individual
i, with indexes r, g, e, c, s, and z for race, gender, education category, city, state, and region,
respectively). We incorporate this information using the following hierarchical model for
respondent’s responses:










αracer[i] for r = 1, . . . , 4
αgenderg[i] for r = 1,2
αedue[i] for e = 1, . . . , 5
(1)
That is, each individual-level variable is modeled as drawn from a normal distribution
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with mean zero and some estimated variance. Following previous work using MRP, we assume
that the effect of demographic factors do not vary geographically. We allow geography to
enter into the model by adding a city level to the model, and giving each city a separate
intercept.
The city effects are modeled as a function of the state into which the city falls, the
city’s average income, the percentage of the city’s residents that are military veterans, and
the percentage of couples in each city that are in same-sex couples. The state effects, in
turn, are modeled as a function of the region into which the state falls, the percentage of
the state’s residents that are union members, and the state’s percentage of evangelical or
Mormon residents. Finally, the region variable is another modeled effect. We group states
into regions based on their general ideology and vote in presidential elections.
The second stage is post-stratification. In this stage, we use the multi-level regression to
make a prediction of public opinion in each demographic-geographic sub-type. The estimates
for each respondent demographic geographic type are then weighted by the percentages of
each type in the actual city populations. Finally, these predictions are summed to produce
an estimate of public opinion in each city.
Validation of City Policy Preferences
In this section, we use a number of complementary approaches to validate our estimates of
city policy preferences. First, we demonstrate the face validity of our estimates by showing
our estimates for all large cities in the country, as well as a subset of cities in four states. Next,
we show the internal validity of our estimates by comparing them with raw, disaggregated
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estimates of the policy preferences in each city based on our sample of 275,000 Americans.
Finally, we use two separate approaches to demonstrate the external validity of our estimates.
We show that our estimates are highly correlated with city-level presidential vote shares in
both 2004 and 2008. We also show that our estimates are highly correlated with estimates
of symbolic ideology from survey samples collected by the Knight Foundation in twenty-six
medium and large cities in 2002.
Face Validity
In order to demonstrate the face validity of our estimates of city conservatism, figure 1 shows
the policy preferences of the 51 cities with a population larger than 250,000 people. We find
significant variation in the policy preferences of cities. Not surprisingly, we find that San
Francisco, Washington DC, and Seattle are three of the most liberal cities in the country.
Mesa AZ, Oklahoma City OK and Virginia Beach VA are three of the most conservative
cities.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 11 shows the mass public’s policy preferences for cities in Texas, Virginia, Michi-
gan, and Massachusetts with more than 75,000 people. The upper-left panel shows the policy
preferences of cities in Texas. As one would expect, Austin is the most liberal city. Other
large, racially diverse cities, such as Dallas and Houston, are also quite liberal. On the other
end of the spectrum, Plano and Amarillo are two of the most conservative cities.
Figure 11 about here
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The upper-right panel shows the policy preferences of cities in Virginia. It shows that
heavily African-American Richmond is the most liberal city in the state, closely followed by
the Northern Virginia cities of Arlington, and Alexandria. In contrast, the most conservative
cities, such as Virginia Beach and Chesapeake, are concentrated in southern Virginia near
the Newport News Naval Base.
The lower-left panel shows the policy preferences of cities in Michigan. Detroit and Ann
Arbor are far and away the most liberal cities. Sterling Heights, Livonia, and Warren are the
three most conservative cities. Finally, the lower-right panel shows the policy preferences of
cities in Massachusetts. Liberal communities in the greater Boston area, such as Cambridge,
Boston, Newton, and Somerville, are the most liberal cities in the state. While no cities in
Massachusetts are to the right of the national mean, Lowell and New Bedford are two of the
more conservative cities.
Internal Validity
Next, we examine the relationship between our MRP-based estimates of city conservatism
and the raw, disaggregated estimates of the mean policy conservatism in each city from
our sample of 275,000 survey respondents. The top panel of figure 12 shows that there
is a very strong relationship between our MRP-based estimates of city conservatism and
the raw, disaggregated estimates of the mean policy conservatism in each city (r=.88). Of
course, the disaggregated estimates are plagued by significant measurement error in cities
with small samples, which is the reason that we use MRP to improve our estimates of the
mass public’s preferences in each city. Thus, the bottom panel only looks at cities with
more than 100,000 people. In these cities, there is a .98 correlation between the MRP and
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disaggregated estimates of city conservatism.
Figure 12 about here
External Validity
Next, we examine the external validity of our estimates by comparing them to several alter-
native measures of city conservatism. One approach commonly employed in previous studies
is to use presidential vote share as a proxy for the ideology of geographic units (e.g., Canes-
Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Erikson and Wright 1980). The advantage of this approach
is that it is explicitly based on electoral behavior and it is available across most cities.
First, we examine the association between our estimates of city conservatism and 2008
presidential vote shares. We estimate 2008 presidential vote share in each city based on
precinct-level election returns (Harvard Election Data Archive, 2012).18 The top panel of
figure 13 shows that there is a strong relationship between presidential vote share and our
estimates of city conservatism. Overall, our estimates of city policy conservatism are corre-
lated with presidential vote share in the 2008 election at .77. Moreover, there appear to be
relatively few outlier cities. This suggests that our estimates are accurately capturing cities’
policy preferences on a left-right continuum.
To further validate our estimates, we compare them with estimates of presidential vote
shares from the 2004 election that the Bay Area Center for Voting Research compiled for
cities with a population greater than 100,000 according to the 2000 Census. According to the
study’s documentation, the researchers obtained information for the applicable cities located
18Due to our GIS-based matching process, there may be some measurement error in our estimates of
presidential vote shares when precinct boundaries do not correspond perfectly with city boundaries.
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within each state by contacting the city recorder, city clerk, or other designated city official.
In many instances, it was the recorder of the county in which that city was located that
held the information by precinct. The votes were tabulated by combining the voting returns
from all of the precincts located in a particular city. The lower panel of figure 13 shows the
results. Overall, there is a correlation of .85 between our estimates of city conservatism and
presidential vote shares in 2004.
Figure 13 about here
Of course, presidential vote shares are not a perfect proxy for ideology (Kernell 2009).
Presidential vote shares in any given election may be largely the product of short-term
forces (Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman 2008). In addition, even if short-term forces could
be removed, the medians of district preferences can only be ranked ordinally based on presi-
dential vote share if researchers are willing to assume equal variance across districts (Kernell
2009). Thus, as a further validation of our estimates, we compare them with a high quality
survey-based measure of city ideology (Palus, 2010).
In 2002, the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation commissioned a survey of twenty-
six communities in which Knight-Ridder newspapers were located. In these surveys, it asked
citizens for their symbolic ideology on a five point scale. There are between 138-736 respon-
dents in the core city of each community.19 We use these samples to estimate the mean
self-identified ideology for the Knight-Ridder cities. The top panel of Figure 14 shows the
relationship between our estimates of city conservatism and the estimates of ideology from
the Knight-Ridder survey. Overall, there is a correlation of .73 between our estimates and
19Due to these relatively small sample sizes, there is considerable measurement error in the ideology
estimates for these cities.
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the estimates of ideology from the Knight-Ridder survey.
Figure 14 about here
Summary
Overall, this appendix has shown that our estimates of city policy conservatism are both
internally and externally valid. They are highly correlated with the raw, disaggregated
measures of city policy preferences from our survey data. They are also highly correlated
with several external metrics of city conservatism, including both presidential vote shares
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Figure 12: Relationship between MRP and Disaggregated City Policy Conservatism: The
top panel shows that across our entire dataset the MRP and raw, disaggregated measures
of the mass public’s policy conservatism in each city are highly correlated. The bottom
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Figure 13: Relationship between City Policy Conservatism and Presidential Vote Share: The
top panel shows the relationship between our estimates and 2008 presidential vote share in
each city in our dataset where presidential vote share information is available. The bottom
panel shows the relationship between our estimates and 2004 presidential vote share in each
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Figure 14: Relationship between City Policy Conservatism and External Metric of City
Conservatism: This graph shows that our measure is highly correlated with a measure of
symbolic ideology from a survey that the Knight Foundation conducted in 22 cities in 2002.
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B Dimensionality of City Policy Preferences
The central claim of our paper is that citizen policy preferences writ large play an important
role in city government. However, understanding what these policy preferences consist of is
itself an important research question. In particular, scholars of municipal politics have often
highlighted the fact that cities consider issues that are different from the sorts of policy issues
that are considered at the federal level (Oliver, Ha, and Callen, 2012). At the same time,
the municipal level is not entirely different from the federal level: there is issue overlap, the
political parties are the same, and citizens tend to have low levels of information on average
about the specifics of municipal policy. As a result, citizens may or may not think about city
policy differently than they think about federal policy. The policy preferences they bring
to bear in deciding who to choose for mayor or city councilor may or may not be quite
different than the policy preferences they bring to bear in deciding who they should support
for President or Senator.
In order to examine the structure of preferences over municipal and federal policy, we
asked a battery of federal policy questions and a battery of questions that was oriented
towards state and local politics on the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. 14
questions were asked about local politics, and 31 questions were asked about federal politics,
some of which we devised, and others of which were part of the “common content” questions
asked on all surveys in the CCES. Table 4 shows the set of questions that will be used in
this analysis.
59
Table 4: Survey Questions used for Scaling City and Federal Preferences
Label Classification Question Summary
ucm321 Municipal City provide health benefits to the same-sex part-
ners of its employees
ucm322 Municipal City take action to reduce its greenhouse gas emis-
sions in order to help address climate change
ucm323 Municipal City subsidize mass transit for low-income people
ucm324 Municipal City provide subsidies and incentives for residents
to install solar energy on their house
ucm325 Municipal City ban smoking in bars and restaurants
ucm326 Municipal City require residents to recycle aluminum cans
and glass bottles
ucm327 Municipal City reduce pensions for government employees
ucm328 Municipal City give tax breaks to businesses that move to
your town
ucm329 Municipal City limit how much landlords can raise their ten-
ants’ rent each year
ucm330 Municipal City offer subsidized housing to the homeless
ucm331 Municipal City eliminate tenure (lifetime employment) for
school teachers
ucm332 Municipal City close parks to save money
ucm333 Municipal City close libraries to save money
ucm358 Municipal Do you think that your city or town should get
most of its revenue from sales taxes or property
taxes?
ucm301 Federal The U. S. government guaranteeing health insur-
ance for all citizens
ucm302 Federal The government passing new rules to protect the
right of workers to unionize.
ucm303 Federal The federal government trying to reduce the in-
come differences between rich and poor Americans.
ucm304 Federal Reducing government regulation of the private sec-
tor.
ucm305 Federal Raising the minimum wage to 10 dollars.
ucm306 Federal Allowing corporations the right to spend unlim-
ited amounts of money supporting and opposing
candidates for office. (This is currently allowed.)
ucm307 Federal Allowing drilling for oil and gas in the Arctic Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge in Alaska.
cc322-1 Federal Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who
have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years
cc322-2 Federal Increase the number of border patrols on the US
Mexican border.
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Table 4: Survey Questions used for Scaling City and Federal Preferences
Label Classification Question Summary
cc322-3 Federal Allow police to question anyone they think may be
in the country illegally.
cc322-4 Federal Fine US businesses that hire illegal immigrants.
cc322-5 Federal Prohibit illegal immigrants from using emergency
hospital care and public schools.
cc322-6 Federal Deny automatic citizenship to American-born chil-
dren of illegal immigrants.
cc305 Federal All things considered do you think it was a mistake
to invade Iraq?
cc306 Federal All things considered do you think it was a mistake
to invade Afghanistan?
cc320 Federal In general do you feel that the laws covering the
sale of firearms should be made more strict less
strict or kept as they are?
cc324 Federal Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees
with your view on abortion?
cc325 Federal Environment v Jobs
cc326 Federal Do you support a Constitutional Amendment ban-
ning Gay Marriage?
cc327 Federal Do you support or oppose affirmative action?
cc328 Federal What would you most prefer that Congress do - cut
domestic spending, cut defense spending or raise
taxes?
cc332a Federal Support or oppose: The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act
cc332b Federal Support or oppose: State Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program
cc332c Federal Support or oppose: American Clean Energy and
Security Act
cc332d Federal Support or oppose: Comprehensive Health Reform
Act
cc332e Federal Support or oppose: Appoint Elena Kagan to the
Supreme Court
cc332f Federal Support or oppose: Financial Reform Bill
cc332g Federal Support or oppose: End Don’t Ask Don’t Tell
cc332h Federal Support or oppose: Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act
cc332i Federal Support or oppose: Embryonic Stem Cell Research














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 15: Correlations between Municipal and Federal Scales
In order to examine the degree to which preferences on municipal and federal policy
issues are related, we take two approaches. The simpler approach is to create two separate
preferences scales from the federal items and the municipal items, respectively, using a one-
dimensional two-parameter logistic item response theory model for each scaling, and regress
the scores on one scale on the scores from the other. This analysis shows the degree to which
the choice of question set affects the result of the scaling. Our preferred, but more complex,
approach is to scale all of the questions in a higher dimensional item response model. This
model determines the extent to which the individual choices can be better explained by
creating distinct preference dimensions for municipal policy items and federal policy items.
Figure 15 shows the results of the first analysis. For each individual, the x-axis represents
that individual’s position on the policy scale created using only the federal policy items and
the y-axis represents that individual’s position on the scale that uses only municipal items.
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There are very few points in the top left and bottom right of the graph, indicating that people
who are municipal liberals and federal conservatives, or vice versa, are very rare. Overall
the relationship between these two scales is quite strong, with a correlation of .75. However,
there is considerable error. This is not unexpected, because there is measurement error in
each scale individually. In particular, there are fewer items in the municipal policy scale,
and as we will see shortly, these items are noisier than the federal policy items on average.
For our second analysis, we run a 4-dimensional model pooling all of the Federal and
Municipal items. Our expectation is that if municipal items are determined by a logic
different from federal items, then the model will attempt to explain these responses by
assigning municipal items and federal items to distinct dimensions. We choose 4 dimensions
to avoid the possibility that higher dimensionality within the federal or municipal items will
obfuscate differences between them.
Table 5 shows the results. In particular, we report the absolute values of the discrimina-
tion parameters (Beta) of the municipal policy items, and the averages and maximum values
for all of the items. The discrimination parameters indicate the degree to which particular
items are informative with respect to respondent positions on particular policy dimensions.
As expected, the first dimension has the highest discrimination, with much lower discrimi-
nation for higher dimensions. For each dimension, the highest discriminating item is always
a Federal policy item. In most cases, the municipal policy items have lower average discrimi-
nation, except for the second dimension, on which the municipal items are just slightly more
discriminating (an average of .58 versus .45). We can find no evidence that any dimension
is characterized by higher discrimination for municipal policy items than other items.
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Table 5: Item Parameters
Item Beta1 Beta2 Beta3 Beta4
Mean (All) 1.12 0.45 0.31 0.39
Max (All) 4.1 2.02 1.37 5.22
ucm321 1.28 1.37 0.33 2.32
ucm322 1.37 0.67 0.48 0.22
ucm323 0.59 0.77 0.2 0.11
ucm324 0.75 0.74 0.49 0.19
ucm325 0.31 0.11 0 0
ucm326 0.44 0.76 0.37 0.32
ucm327 0.8 0.68 0.44 0.48
ucm328 0.49 0.88 0.38 0.35
ucm329 0.45 0.43 0.27 0.17
ucm330 0.7 0.59 0.06 0.03
ucm331 0.88 0.68 0.35 0.59
ucm332 0.47 0.18 0.02 0.18
ucm333 0.47 0.27 0.09 0.25
ucm358 0.29 0.02 0.04 0.19
On balance, Table 5 shows variation in the discrimination of particular policy items, but
no evidence that separate forces are at work in determining citizens’ positions on municipal
policy questions and federal policy questions. Two questions that stand out for high discrim-
ination are question 321, about benefits for same-sex partners who are municipal employees,
and 322, about whether or not the city should take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
We might suppose that these questions are less noisy precisely because they are linked to
high profile federal and state policy issues. In contrast, some issues that seem uniquely local,
such as 332 and 333, about closing parks and libraries, or 358, about the proper mix of sales
and property taxes, are particularly noisy on all dimensions. This finding is consistent with
the belief in the literature that citizens are poorly informed about matters of local policy.
This may help explain why the residuals in Figure 15 can be large.
Overall, for this set of questions, it looks like questions of municipal policy are determined
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by the same underlying values, attitudes and predispositions as questions of federal policy.
But the qualifier “for this set of questions” is an important one. Our survey is one of the
first that we know of to ask a national sample a battery of questions about local policy.
Our choices of questions were rather arbitrary, biasing towards policies that we ourselves
are familiar with. Future research should explore the extent to which we have captured the
“key issues” or local policy. For instance, Oliver, Ha, and Callen (2012) suggests that land
use policy is one of the dominant items on the agenda in local politics, and yet we have not
asked any questions about land use policy. If citizens have preferences about, say, zoning
and eminent domain that are strongly held and distinct from their preferences over federal
policies, the current analysis would not capture this distinction.
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C Questions Used to Estimate City Policy Scale
Table 6 below lists the questions asked on the 2010 International City/County Manage-
ment Association sustainability survey that were used to create our index of the overall
conservatism of city policy. Each set of items is preceded by a prompt such as “Please indi-
cate which of the following actions your locality has taken related to sustainability, energy
conservation, resilience, climate change, emissions reductions, or similar concerns in your
community” or “Please indicate which of the following programs your local government has.”
If the government implements a policy that item is coded as 1, otherwise it is coded as 0.
Table 6: ICMA items that went into our scale of city policies
Question Text
1a To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? The environment
1b To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? The economy
1c To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Social justice
1d To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Climate change
1e To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Green jobs
1f To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Energy conservation
1g To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Housing for all
income groups
1h To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Public transit
2a Adoption by the governing body of a resolution stating policy goals. (Regarding
sustainability)
2b Adoption by the governing body a plan with specific targets or benchmarks.
2c Establishment of a sustainability policy and/or plan by the chief executive.
2d Appointment of a citizens committee & commission & or task force.
2e Provided a budget specifically for the sustainability effort
2f Dedicated staff to the sustainability effort
4a Baseline greenhouse gas emissions of the local government
4b Baseline greenhouse gas emissions of the community
4c Greenhouse gas reduction targets for local government operations
4d Greenhouse gas reduction targets for businesses
4e Greenhouse gas reduction targets for multi-family residences
4f Greenhouse gas reduction targets for single-family residences
4g Locally initiated air pollution measures to reduce dust and particulate matter
4h Plan for tree preservation and planting
5a Tree City USA designation
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Table 6: ICMA items that went into our scale of city policies
Question Text
5b EPA Smart Growth Achievement Award
5c Phoenix Award for Brownfields Redevelopment
5d Historic Preservation Merit Awards
5e Other sustainability award
6a Actions to conserve the quantity of water from aquifers
6b Use of grey-water and/or reclaimed-water use systems
6c Sets limits on impervious surfaces on private property
6d Use water price structure to encourage conservation
6e Other incentives for water conservation behaviors by city & residents & and busi-
nesses
7a Internal program that recycles paper and plastic and glass in your local government
7b Community-wide recycling collection program for paper and plastic and glass for
residential properties
7c Community-wide recycling collection program for paper and plastic and glass for
commercial properties
7d Recycling of household hazardous waste
7e Recycling of household electronic equipment (e-waste)
7f Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT) program with charges based on the amount of waste
discarded
7g Community-wide collection of organic material for composting
7h Require minimum of 30% post-consumer recycled content for everyday office paper
use
8a Established a fuel efficiency target for the government fleet of vehicles
8b Increased the purchase of fuel efficient vehicles
8c Purchased hybrid electric vehicles
8d Purchased vehicles that operate on compressed natural gas (CNG)
8e Installed charging stations for electric vehicles
8f Conducted energy audits of government buildings
8g Installed energy management systems to control heating and cooling in buildings
8h Established policy to only purchase Energy Star equipment when available
8i Upgraded or retrofitted facilities to higher energy efficiency office lighting
8j Upgraded or retrofitted traffic signals to improve efficiency
8k Upgraded or retrofitted streetlights or and other exterior lighting to improve effi-
ciency
8l Upgraded or retrofitted facilities to higher energy efficiency heating and air condi-
tioning systems
8m Upgraded or retrofitted facilities to higher energy efficiency pumps in the water or
sewer systems
8n Utilize dark sky compliant outdoor light fixtures
8o Installed solar panels on a government facility
8p Installed a geo-thermal system
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Table 6: ICMA items that went into our scale of city policies
Question Text
8q Generated electricity through municipal operations such as refuse disposal & wastew-
ater treatment & or landfill
11a Energy Audit-Individual residences
11b Weatherization- Individual residences
11c Heating / air conditioning upgrades- Individual residences
11d Purchase of energy efficient appliances- Individual residences
11e Installation of solar equipment- Individual residences
11f Energy Audit-Businesses
11g Weatherization-Businesses
11h Heating / air conditioning upgrades-Businesses
11i Purchase of energy efficient appliances-Businesses
11j Installation of solar equipment-Businesses
12a Take mass transit to work (government incentive?)
12b Carpool to work (government incentive?)
12c Walk to work (government incentive?)
12d Bike to work (government incentive?)
17a Expanded dedicated bike lanes on streets
17b Added biking and walking trails
17c Added bike parking facilities
17d Expanded bus routes
17e Requiring sidewalks in new development
17f Widened sidewalks
17i Require showers and changing facilities for employees
21a Require all new government construction projects to be LEED or Energy Star cer-
tified
21b Require all retrofit government projects to be LEED or Energy Star certified
21c Permit higher density development near public transit nodes
21d Permit higher density development where infrastructure is already in place (utilities
and transportation)
21e Incentives other than increased density for new commercial development (including
multi-family residential) that are LEED Certified or an equivalent
21f Incentives other than increased density for new single-family residential be LEED
certified or the equivalent
21g Apply LEED Neighborhood Design standards
21h Provide density incentives for sustainable development (such as energy efficiency &
recycling of materials & land preservation & storm water enhancement & etc.)
21i Provide tax incentives for sustainable development (such as energy efficiency & re-
cycling of materials & land preservation & storm water enhancement & etc.)
21j Reduce fees for environmentally friendly development
21k Fast track plan reviews and or inspections for environmentally friendly development
21l Residential zoning codes to permit solar installations & wind power & or other
renewable energy production
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Table 6: ICMA items that went into our scale of city policies
Question Text
21m Residential zoning codes to permit higher densities through ancillary dwellings units
or apartments (such as basement units & garage units & or in-house suites)
21n Zoning codes encourage more mixed-use development
22a An active brownfields & vacant property & or other program for revitalizing aban-
doned or underutilized residential & commercial or industrial lands and buildings
22b A land conservation program
22c A program for the purchase or transfer of development rights to preserve open space
22d A program for the purchase or transfer of development rights to create more efficient
development
22e A program for the purchase or transfer of development rights to preserve historic
property
23a Provide financial support/incentives for affordable housing
23b Provide supportive housing to people with disabilities
23c Provide housing options for the elderly
23d Provide housing within your community to homeless persons
23e Provide access to information technology for persons without connection to the
internet
23f Provide funding for pre-school education
23g Provide after-school programs for children
23h Report on community quality of life indicators & such as education & cultural &
diversity & and social well-being
25a Restriction on purchase of bottled water by the local government
25b Use of public land for community gardens
25c Support a local farmer’s market
25d Education program in the local community dealing with the environment and energy
conservation
25e Locate recycling containers close to refuse containers in public spaces such as streets
and parks
25f Green product purchasing policy in local government
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D Description of Entropy Balancing Analysis
Our main analysis uses entropy balancing to ensure balance across our treatment and con-
trol conditions (Hainmueller, 2012). Entropy balancing matching applies a maximum entropy
reweighting scheme that calibrates unit weights so that the reweighted treatment and control
group satisfy a potentially large set of prespecified balance conditions that incorporate in-
formation about known sample moments. In our analysis, for each institutional hypothesis,
we balance our covariates first moments for cities with one institution, and cities with the
other. The “control” group may then be compared to the “treatment” group. This enables
us to simply compare the slope of the relationship between outcomes and policy preferences
for the two groups. We balance on median income, median home values, population, the
presence of each institution, and city conservatism.
In addition to the loess curves in the main body of the text, we also test for significance
in these results using a simple linear models. Tables 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 show the results
of these models. The models are regressions of each policy outcome on city conservatism,
the institution in question, and their interaction, with state fixed effects. In no case is the
institutional interaction consistently significant across policy outcomes.
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Policy Scale Expend. PC Taxes PC Sales Taxes
(Intercept) 0.59∗ 2838.30∗∗∗ 765.84∗∗∗ 0.13∗
(0.24) (396.58) (184.10) (0.06)
City Conservatism 1.12∗∗∗ −313.69∗∗ −131.08∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.23) (110.65) (51.80) (0.02)
Elected Mayor 0.44∗∗∗ −46.24 −7.84 0.00
(0.09) (44.42) (20.77) (0.01)
Elected Mayor x City Conservatism −0.67∗ −247.04 −133.67∗ 0.00
(0.32) (138.11) (64.60) (0.03)
FE for States X X X X
Controls X X X X
R2 0.47 0.58 0.69 0.76
Adj. R2 0.40 0.56 0.68 0.75
Num. obs. 428 1462 1434 907
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 7: Elected Mayor: Entropy Balancing
Policy Scale Expend. PC Taxes PC Sales Taxes
(Intercept) 0.81∗∗∗ 3524.11∗∗∗ 856.57∗∗ 0.21∗
(0.19) (597.38) (283.37) (0.09)
City Conservatism 0.38 −738.97∗∗∗ −194.42∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.23) (126.51) (59.57) (0.02)
Partisan Elections −0.13 −75.91 112.71∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.12) (61.07) (29.17) (0.01)
Partisan Elections x City Conservatism 0.35 241.05 −72.92 −0.10∗∗∗
(0.29) (159.45) (74.61) (0.03)
FE for States X X X X
Controls X X X X
R2 0.51 0.63 0.76 0.71
Adj. R2 0.45 0.62 0.75 0.70
Num. obs. 428 1462 1434 907
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 8: Partisan Elections: Entropy Balancing
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Policy Scale Expend. PC Taxes PC Sales Taxes
(Intercept) 0.96∗∗∗ 4056.60∗∗∗ 1221.48∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(0.20) (502.43) (226.37) (0.08)
City Conservatism 0.95∗∗∗ −305.99∗ −134.70∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.24) (130.52) (59.36) (0.03)
Direct Dem. 0.23∗∗ 120.52∗ 47.09∗ 0.00
(0.09) (47.16) (21.43) (0.01)
Direct Dem. x City Conservatism −0.22 37.68 −89.99 0.03
(0.30) (157.38) (71.47) (0.03)
FE for States X X X X
Controls X X X X
R2 0.45 0.46 0.59 0.73
Adj. R2 0.38 0.44 0.57 0.72
Num. obs. 428 1462 1434 907
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 9: Direct Dem: Entropy Balancing
Policy Scale Expend. PC Taxes PC Sales Taxes
(Intercept) 1.09 3984.02∗∗∗ 1291.81∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.65) (294.82) (119.80) (0.04)
City Conservatism 0.99∗∗∗ −204.83 −170.47∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.29) (146.55) (59.84) (0.03)
Term Limits −0.05 37.98 −29.39 −0.01
(0.09) (49.34) (20.07) (0.01)
Term Limits x City Conservatism 0.12 −110.77 66.47 0.04
(0.35) (174.91) (71.56) (0.03)
FE for States X X X X
Controls X X X X
R2 0.36 0.55 0.73 0.77
Adj. R2 0.28 0.53 0.72 0.76
Num. obs. 428 1462 1434 907
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 10: Term Limits: Entropy Balancing
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Policy Scale Expend. PC Taxes PC Sales Taxes
(Intercept) 2.21∗∗ 4090.95∗∗∗ 1189.60∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.78) (508.75) (229.20) (0.08)
City Conservatism 1.60∗∗∗ −344.02∗ −108.33 0.15∗∗∗
(0.32) (135.49) (61.46) (0.02)
At-large elections 0.04 −44.52 −14.48 0.01
(0.10) (44.32) (20.12) (0.01)
At-large elections x Conservatism −0.24 353.54∗ −11.26 −0.07∗∗
(0.36) (158.45) (72.09) (0.03)
FE for States X X X X
Controls X X X X
R2 0.38 0.41 0.62 0.79
Adj. R2 0.30 0.38 0.61 0.78
Num. obs. 428 1462 1434 907
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 11: At-large elections: Entropy Balancing
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E Instit. Results Using Coarsened Exact Matching
In this appendix, we validate our institutional results using an alternative matching method,
and use a linear model to show that the results from the main text are rarely significant. Our
findings regarding institutions are all null, so by definition they are not robust. However, we
wish to show these null results are not the result of choosing a particular matching method.
In the body of the paper we used entropy balancing as a matching method to examine the
effect of different institutions on municipal accountability. We validate our results here using
coarsened exact matching. Coarsened exact matching proceeds by establishing categories for
the matching variables, and then dropping all observations in either institutional condition
that do not have an exact match in all categories for the other condition. Variables are
coarsened by assigning continuous values to a small number of categories for each variable.
These categories are defined by a set of thresholds. Cities sharing the same category for some
variable are considered “equivalent” for the purposes of the analysis. It is assumed that these
cities are substantively similar. Each observation in one condition (treatment or control) is
then weighted to reflect any imbalances in the number of treatment and control observations
in one strata, a set of observations that have the same values for the coarsened variables.
Each matching analysis is performed using all of the variables in Table 12 below, with the
exception that the institutional “treatments” are not included in the matching analyses that
involve that institution. So, for instance, in the analysis of partisan versus non-partisan
elections, cities are not matched on this institution.
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Table 12: Matching Variables
Variable Thresholds for Coarsening
Median Home Value 87; 122; 173 (thousands of dollars)
Population 26; 36; 61; 300; 1000 (thousands of people)
Median Income 35; 44; 58 (thousands of dollars)
City Mean Preferences -0.21; -0.04; 0.12
Partisan Elections Already dichotomous: Partisan and non-partisan
Government Type Already dichotomous: Mayoral or Council-Manager
Term Limits Already dichotomous: Term Limited or not
Initiatives Already dichotomous: Initiatives allowed or not
At-large districts Already dichotomous: At-large or single-member districts
Figures 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 show the results using coaresened exact matching. These
graphs correspond to Figures 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, respectively, which use entropy balancing.
The most notable differences between these sets of figures is the number of data points, and
the variation in the slopes of the loess curves. Where entropy balancing creates weights for
each data point, coarsened exact matching first drops data point without a corresponding
exact match, then weights the remaining data so the treatment and control have equally-
weighted observations in each cell. Unfortunately, the set of covariates above creates a large
number of cells, leading to many dropped data points. The results of these Figures should
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 16: Type of Government. The black points in each panel are municipalities with
elected mayors and the grey points are municipalities with council manager governments.
Each black line is the loess curve for the mayoral cities. The grey line is a weighted loess curve
for the council-manager cities that uses coarsened exact matching weights. These weights
are chosen to achieve balance between the two instutional conditions on median income,
median home values, population, city conservatism and the use of partisan elections, ballot



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 17: Partisan Elections. The black points in each panel are municipalities with partisan
elections and the grey points are municipalities with non-partisan elections. Each black line is
the loess curve for the partisan-election cities. The grey line is a weighted loess curve for the
non-partisan election cities that uses coarsened exact matching weights. These weights are
chosen to achieve balance between the two instutional conditions on median income, median
home values, population, city conservatism and the use of direct mayoral elections, ballot


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 18: Direct Democracy. The black points in each panel are municipalities that allow
ballot initiatives and the grey points are municipalities that do not. Each black line is the
loess curve for the ballot initiative cities. The grey line is a weighted loess curve for the
non-ballot initiative cities that uses coarsened exact matching weights. These weights are
chosen to achieve balance between the two instutional conditions on median income, median
home values, population, city conservatism and the use of direct mayoral elections, partisan






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 19: Term Limits. The black points in each panel are municipalities that have city
council term limits and the grey points are municipalities that do not. Each black line is
the loess curve for the term limit cities. The grey line is a weighted loess curve for the non-
term limit initiative cities that uses coarsened exact matching weights. These weights are
chosen to achieve balance between the two instutional conditions on median income, median
home values, population, city conservatism and the use of direct mayoral elections, partisan




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 20: At-Large Elections. The black points in each panel are municipalities that have
at-large elections and the grey points are municipalities that do not. Each black line is the
loess curve for the at-large cities. The grey line is a weighted loess curve for the mixed or
single-member district cities that uses coarsened exact matching weights. These weights are
chosen to achieve balance between the two instutional conditions on median income, median
home values, population, city conservatism and the use of direct mayoral elections, partisan
elections, ballot initiatives, and term limits. Cities with no exact matches are dropped.
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In addition to using coarsened exact matching to validate our results, we also test for
significance in these results using a simple linear model in lieu of loess curves. Tables ??,
14, 15,16 and 17 show the results of these models. The models are regressions of each policy
outcome on city conservatism, the institution in question, and their interaction, controlling
for state fixed effects. In no case is the institutional interaction significant. However, this
information is not very useful in cases with very few exact matches. In particular, there are
often very few cases when the dependent variable is the general policy scale. In the case of
elected mayors versus council-manager systems, there are too few observations to run this
model.
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Policy Scale Expend. PC Taxes PC Sales Taxes
(Intercept) −0.27 1753.18∗∗∗ 882.83∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(2.73) (376.51) (146.71) (0.08)
City Conservatism 0.09 −350.94 −249.29∗ 0.04
(2.62) (286.45) (112.33) (0.07)
Elected Mayor −0.60 9.65 12.92 0.01
(0.77) (91.28) (35.78) (0.02)
City Conservatism x Elected Mayor 0.80 108.17 270.60 −0.12
(3.18) (344.43) (137.67) (0.08)
FE for States X X X X
Controls X X X X
R2 0.48 0.45 0.67 0.82
Adj. R2 -0.68 0.37 0.63 0.78
Num. obs. 40 418 395 179
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 13: Statistical models
Policy Scale Expend. PC Taxes PC Sales Taxes
(Intercept) 2.73 1122.05∗∗ 523.38∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(3.13) (379.39) (211.11) (0.09)
City Conservatism −2.77 −296.86 122.83 0.07
(1.69) (316.80) (184.68) (0.09)
Partisan Election 0.20 −121.48 186.77∗ −0.01
(0.71) (131.20) (74.24) (0.03)
City Conservatism x Partisan Elections 5.63 440.78 28.70 −0.06
(3.17) (383.54) (218.64) (0.11)
FE for States X X X X
Controls X X X X
R2 0.62 0.79 0.85 0.75
Adj. R2 -0.02 0.74 0.81 0.69
Num. obs. 44 306 266 142
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 14: Partisan Elections : CEM
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Policy Scale Expend. PC Taxes PC Sales Taxes
(Intercept) 1.10 1279.78∗∗∗ 636.70∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(1.23) (212.40) (113.03) (0.05)
City Conservatism 1.01 −291.09 −191.77 0.09
(0.95) (219.43) (116.92) (0.05)
Direct Democracy 0.26 208.20∗∗ 63.31 −0.01
(0.29) (66.36) (35.67) (0.02)
City Conservatism x Direct Democracy −0.94 506.78∗ 221.46 −0.09
(1.08) (235.15) (125.81) (0.06)
FE for States X X X X
Controls X X X X
R2 0.39 0.46 0.59 0.72
Adj. R2 0.04 0.41 0.55 0.69
Num. obs. 109 576 569 390
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 15: Direct Democracy: CEM
Policy Scale Expend. PC Taxes PC Sales Taxes
(Intercept) −0.06 7381.57∗∗∗ 2354.89∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.89) (910.06) (342.78) (0.11)
City Conservatism 0.22 −413.71 −240.38∗ 0.06
(0.65) (294.65) (112.97) (0.04)
Term Limits −0.28 93.37 −0.40 −0.02
(0.25) (104.03) (39.30) (0.01)
City Conservatism x Term Limits 0.81 475.00 167.05 −0.01
(0.85) (371.33) (141.88) (0.05)
R2 0.55 0.42 0.56 0.80
Adj. R2 0.37 0.34 0.51 0.78
Num. obs. 73 441 435 300
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 16: Term Limits: CEM
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Policy Scale Expend. PC Taxes PC Sales Taxes
(Intercept) 0.67 1070.44∗∗∗ 698.91∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(1.26) (302.74) (106.08) (0.04)
City Conservatism 0.73 −612.18∗ −142.08 0.10∗
(0.92) (240.46) (85.22) (0.04)
At-large Elections 0.33 −76.50 12.51 0.00
(0.27) (70.38) (25.03) (0.01)
City Conservatism x At-large Elections −1.02 620.30∗∗ 115.42 0.01
(1.10) (239.89) (86.81) (0.04)
FE for States X X X X
Controls X X X X
R2 0.45 0.42 0.63 0.87
Adj. R2 0.14 0.37 0.59 0.86
Num. obs. 86 573 552 354
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 17: At-large Elections: CEM
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